Previous studies of theory of mind abilities in young people with autism have found that their understanding of false belief is specifically impaired, but that simple aspects of desire are understood in line with mental age. We explored the possibility that more complex aspects of desire (in which comparison of goals with outcomes is not a sufficient strategy) are not understood by children with autism. In two experiments, we found that these children were specifically impaired in understanding desire satisfaction and desire change, when compared with children with mental handicap and normal 4-6-year-olds. Although there was some evidence that understanding of desires may be easier for individuals with autism than understanding false belief, it would appear that they have difficulties in understanding both epistemic and volitional mental states.
Autism is a developmental disorder of or-tism is the failure to appreciate the inner ganic origin that is characterized by impair-world of subjective experience, such as peoments in reciprocal social interaction and pie's thoughts and feelings. This is apparent communication, together with a restricted, in the failure to show empathy or to demonrepetitive repertoire of behaviors and a lack strate embarrassment, shame and pride, of imaginative activity. It is frequently (al-These three emotions are thought to be a though not always) associated with mental consequence of appreciating what others retardation, and is thought to involve basic might think (Harris, 1989) . A conspicuous cognitive deficits that have implications for feature of the communication impairment, social functioning (Rutter, 1983) . One strik-among those individuals with good Ianing aspect of the social impairment in au-guage development, is the pragmatic failure to adapt utterances to the knowledge or in----terests of the hearer (Baron-Cohen, 1988: The work reported in this paper was submitted as par-T T?u^u arn iao/n tial fulfillment of a Ph.D. thesis in Psychology, Instil ager-^iUSDerg, IW3).
tute of Psychiatry, University of London, by the first In recent years, considerable evidence author. She was supported during this research by an has been reported suggesting that the failure MRC studentship. We thank the students and staff at to take account of the world of mental expeBaskerville School Birmingham, Griffin Manor r i e n c e c o n s t i t u t e s a c o • d fi j .
School, London, Ridgeway School, Warwick, Round . . , , %v «;«wiuuu Oak School, uiiington. Emscote First School, Wara u t l s ml t has been proposed that there is an wick, and Contact Centre Playgroup, Warwick. Their impairment in the cognitive mechanism friendly cooperation was greatly appreciated. We also dedicated to interpreting human action in express our gratitude to Janet Astington for supplying terms of underlying beliefs, intentions de-children and young people with autism with desire or simply of having consistent preferverbal mental ages in excess of 4 years fail ences is unclear, because the desire still extests of understanding their own or others' isted at the time of questioning. Finally, beliefs (Baron-Cohen, 1993; Happe", 1993) . Baron-Cohen (1991b) tested whether or not Furthermore, of the minority who pass be-children with autism could recall a past, lief tests set at the normal preschool level, noncurrent desire. He offered subjects two most fail tasks designed for 7-year-olds boxes, and invited them to choose one to (Baron-Cohen, 1989 ). This evidence sug-open. After they had seen the contents, he gests that understanding epistemic mental closed up that box and then asked them states (belief, knowledge) is specifically im-which box they would now like to open. Of paired in autism. Questions about the ori-course, they selected the other one. Before gins of this theory of mind impairment are this new box was opened (and the desire satthe subject of current debate (Baron-Co-isfied), the subject was asked which box he hen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 1993) .
or she had wanted to open at the beginning. A second main class of mental state is vo-The children with autism were as accurate lition. This class includes the mental states as a mentally handicapped control group of intention, goal, and desire. Philosophical and a group of 3-4-year-old normally develaccounts of understanding behavior have oping children in recalling their earlier deconsistently stressed the importance of rea-sire. One earlier unpublished investigation soning about both beliefs and desires in suggested that children with autism may be making sense of and predicting action (Den-impaired in understanding that a single obnett, 1978) . Unlike emotions, both desires ject or event can be either desirable or undeand beliefs are unobservable states that sirable. Harris and Muncer (1988) found have no bodily manifestations. However, that children with autism were impaired unlike beliefs, desires are rarely emotionally (relative to normal children of similar menneutral. Rather, they are usually affectively tal age) in the ability to understand that, charged: their satisfaction leads to positive when two protagonists want incompatible emotions and their frustration leads to neg-but equally pleasant things, only one will be ative affect. The purpose of this paper is to satisfied with the outcome. Unfortunately, examine the extent to which children with this study did not control for the influence autism are able to understand desire, which of mental handicap, because only a normal although it is a volitional mental state, control group was tested. Therefore it canwould appear also to involve the realm of not be concluded that the observed deficit affect.
was necessarily autism-specific. Three previous studies have indicated Taken together, these studies suggest that, in autism, understanding of desire that understanding volitional mental states may be in line with mental age. First, such as desire may be relatively unimpaired Baron-Cohen (1991a) found that children in autism, whereas comprehension of epiwith autism did not differ from a group of stemic states seems to be severely limited, children with mental handicap in their abil-This is consistent with the finding that ity to predict how a story character would young normal children understand desire feel, according to whether the character's before belief (Dunn, 1991; Flavell, Flavell, desire was fulfilled or unfulfilled. However, Green, & Moses, 1990; Hadwin & Perner, children with autism were specifically im-1991; Wellman, 1990) . However, it is not paired in a similar condition in which they obvious why desires should be understood had to take account of the character's desire by children with autism when beliefs are and mistaken belief in predicting her emo-not. One difference between belief and detion. Second, Tan and Harris (1991) found sire understanding is that judging when dethat children with autism were able to re-sires are satisfied can be achieved often by call their own previously stated desires, simply comparing a person's goal with the Whether this is evidence of understanding outcome-where these match, a person is deemed to be satisfied. Several authors have
In the experiments below, the test quessuggested that this understanding of goals tions involve use of the terms "meant to" and outcomes requires a less mature under-and "gonna," but we wish to point out that standing of mental states. According to this does not signify that an understanding Leslie (in press), representation of the rela-of the mental state of intention is being tionships between goals and outcomes may tested. Astington (1994) proposed that the be the responsibility of one cognitive sub-language of desire (want) and the language system (system ; of the "Theory of Mind of intention (mean to, try to, gonna) appear Mechanism") that may be relatively unim-not to be differentiated by normal children paired in autism. In Baron-Cohen's (in under 4-5 years-they seem to have an unpress) model, simple volitional states (desire differentiated concept of desire/intention, and goal) are represented by a separate cog-In many situations, such a concept is adenitive mechanism (ID, the "Intentionality quate to understand volition, because peoDetector") that may be relatively unimpaired pie normally intend to do what will satisfy in autism. This system is based on Premack's their desires. Phillips (1993) has argued that (1990) proposal. According t o Perner a test may only claim to tap intention specif-(1991), comparison of goal and outcome ically where intentions are not confounded may not require a concept of desire as a rep-with desires. An example of such a situation resentation of the world. However, in his -would be when a particular outcome is view, a representational concept of mind is wanted, but no intention is formed to acnecessary for understanding that desires can complish this. Similarly, when a desire is be changed and manipulated and are subject satisfied, but not as a consequence of an into self-control. Furthermore, according to tention being carried out, then desires and Astington (1991 Astington ( , 1994 , a representational intentions are not confounded. In the exconcept of desire and intention is needed also periments that follow, desires and intento understand how the mind causes events in tions are always consistent with one anthe world, because actions are directly other, which means that the test question caused by mental representations-that is, can be answered correctly on the basis of eiintentions. Thus, one possibility is that an ther intention or desire. In the interests of understanding of desire that goes beyond a parsimony, therefore, we describe these two simple comparison of explicit information experiments as tests of understanding deabout goals and outcomes may be beyond sire.
1 Empirical work using "true" tests of the abilities of children with autism.
understanding intention are reported in
The two experiments reported here were Phillips et al. (1995) . designed to explore the ability of highfunctioning children with autism to under-. stand volition. In keeping with the analyses E x P e ™ e n t 1: The Acc.dents Test by Perner (1991) and Astington (1991, This experiment was based on a study 1994), a separation will be maintained be-carried out with young normal children by tween understanding desire satisfaction and Astington and Lee (1991) . The focus of the understanding other aspects of volition, experiment was understanding of the satissuch as desire change, desirability, and in-faction conditions of desire. This was tested tentional causation. We addressed the fol-under two different conditions. In the Exlowing issues. First, can children with au-plicit condition, goal information was given tism understand the satisfaction conditions verbally and visually. In the Implicit condiof desire when the information needed for matching goal and outcome is not explicit?
. tion, goal information was not supplied 1990). As is frequently found, individuals overtly, although it could be inferred from with autism were somewhat more able on the context. The purpose of the test was to the test of nonverbal ability than in the Ianfind out whether children with autism find guage comprehension measure. For the two it more difficult to judge desire satisfaction groups of normal children, it was assumed when they do not have access to explicit in-that MA was, on average, the same as formation on goals and outcomes. chronological age (CA). The 4-year-old Previous studies of desire understanding normal group was chosen because that is the in normal children involved comparing in-age at which many existing tests of underformation about a person's goal with facts standing mental states are first passed. The about outcome (Hadwin & Perner, 1991 ; older normal children were equivalent in Yuill, 1984) . Where these match, desires mean VMA to the autism and mental handican be said to be satisfied. If such data are cap groups. Age and mental age data are explicitly given, a simple visual (or verbal) summarized in Table 1 . matching strategy might lead to a correct For the autism group, participants were solution without reference to mental states, attending specialist schools for pupils with Astington and Lee (1991) found, using this autism. All had a formal diagnosis of autest, that children younger than 4 years-of-tism, using established criteria (Rutter, age could judge desire-satisfaction when in-1978). Any potential participant with an formation about goals was made explicit, equivocal diagnosis, such as "autistic feabut had considerable difficulty understand-tures," was not included in the sample. For ing desire when they could not simply read the mental handicap group, participants off and compare goals and outcomes. If, as were drawn from schools for pupils with seearlier studies implied, children with autism vere or moderate levels of learning disabilunderstood the satisfaction conditions of ity (mental retardation). Seven individuals desire, we would expect them to perform had Down syndrome, one had spina bifida, well in both conditions. If, however, the rel-one had cerebral palsy, and the remainder ative competence shown in earlier studies had mental handicap of unspecified etiolwas based on a simple matching strategy ogy. Some investigators (e.g., Cicchetti & only, then we would expect them to be im-Pogge-Hesse, 1982) have recommended paired in the Implicit condition, relative to that research with atypical children should control groups of equivalent mental age. employ groups that are etiologically homogeneous, to be able to tease apart develop-" . . mental issues. There are clear advantages to this approach, and indeed some "theory of _ . . mind" studies have used control groups consisting of children with Down syndrome Four groups of participants were tested, (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) . Our Children and adolescents with autism; chil-choice of a heterogeneous control group dren and adolescents with mental handicap; was made for two reasons, both related to normally developing 4-year-old children; the need to obtain a reasonable comparison normally developing 5-and 6-year-olds, with regard to level of functioning. First, The clinical groups were equivalent in ver-the autism group included several young bal mental age (VMA), as measured by the people with relatively high verbal MA. In Test of Reception of Grammar (TROG; the schools in which we recruited subjects, Bishop, 1989) . All participants in these two there were no students with Down syngroups had a verbal MA in excess of 4 l A drome who had comparable verbal ability, years. Nonverbal mental age (NVMA) was Second, there is some indication that chilassessed using Raven's Coloured Progres-dren with Down syndrome have pragmatic sive Matrices (Raven, Court, & Raven, language their syntactic development (Beeghly, comes were specifically mentioned and Weiss-Perry, & Cicchetti, 1990) . This is a clearly depicted (by means of a "think bubreversal of the typical pattern in autism ble"). In the two implicit pairs, outcome in- (Tager-Flusberg, 1993 ), yet our matching formation was given, but there was no menvariable was a measure of syntax compre-tion of the characters' goals. In each story, hension. Furthermore, children with Down a character was shown in a familiar context, syndrome are frequently described as being an action took place, and an outcome arose, very outgoing and sociable. It has been In one story within a pair, the character got shown that this perception has some basis in what s/he wanted. In the other, the characfact (Gibbs & Thorpe, 1983 ). We felt that ter got the same thing-by mistake-but it a more conservative comparison would be was not what was wanted. Participants had with a group of young people with a to judge which of the two characters was broader range of pragmatic ability and "so-satisfied. In each pair, the outcomes were ciability." 2 the same, but the characters' goals differed. In the autism group, 19 participants were One Explicit and one Implicit pair are male and 5 were female, reflecting the large shown in Figure 1 . The original pictures predominance of males in autism (Lord, were 15-cm square and in color, to highlight Schopler, & Revicki, 1982) . In the mental the critical features, handicap group, there were 16 males and 8
In the other explicit pair, two girls are females. The gender ratio for each of the trying to throw balls into colored buckets, normal groups was almost exactly 1:1.
One throws the ball into the desired bucket (red), the other gets hers in the same bucket, but that was not what she wanted to hapTask and materials pen. In the other implicit pair, a girl has . r 1 * • A some bread. She takes it outside to eat it. Four pairs of very simple stories were used, _, , ,
." J U *u v A • Some crumbs drop behind her. The brds each story illustrated by three line drawings. , / . " , ; ,
• • u *u 1 J * P ec k them up. Another girl takes some In the two explicit pairs, both goals and out-r . , . , . , . V :
H bread outside and throws crumbs on the .
floor, and then some birds come and eat 2. it is worth noting that an autism group cannot be them. Participants were asked "Which girl claimed to be etiologically "pure": Unlike Down m e a n t t h e b i r d s t Q t t h f i c r u m b s ? » syndrome, the biological substrate for this behav-D . .
. °i orally defined disorder has yet to be identified, and
Participants m the autism, mental handiindeed there may be more than one. Conceivably, a ca P» a n d 4-year-old groups were also given diagnostically homogeneous group may be etiologi-a composite standard false-belief task. This caiiy heterogeneous.
included the Sally-Anne task (Baron-Co- , 1985) and the Teddy task [a version of the "unexpected contents" task (Perner, Frith, Leslie, & Leekam, 1989 ) that used a little teddy in a Band-aid tin]. The tests were carried out exactly as described in the original studies.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a quiet, familiar room in school. The order of stories within pairs was counterbalanced, so that the desire-satisfied version always came first in one pair and second in the other. This was done for both explicit and implicit conditions. The order of story pairs within conditions was also systematically varied. Furthermore, the order of presentation of the two conditions was counterbalanced across subjects. To pass a condition, participants had to answer the test question correctly for both pairs of stories. The test question was a forced choice between two alternatives, and therefore the probability of getting both questions correct by chance alone was .25.
Results
The order of presentation within and between conditions did not influence performance (Yates's chi-square or Fisher's exact tests, all p > .05). Performance by all groups was greater than expected by chance in the explicit condition (binomial tests, all p < .05). However, in the implicit condition, only the mental handicap and 5-6-year groups exceeded chance performance (binomial tests,/? < .001).
The results are summarized in Table 2 and presented graphically in Figure 2 . As expected, more participants passed the explicit condition than the implicit one. In the explicit condition, group differences were not statistically significant (chi-square test, X 2 = 6.99, 3 df, p = .07). In the implicit condition, there were large differences between groups (x 2 = 18.65, 3 df, p < .001). Specific pair-wise comparisons, using Tukey-like range tests on the proportions of groups who passed (Collis, 1992) , showed that the autism group differed significantly from both the mental handicap and 5-6-year-old groups (p < .01). No other significant group differences emerged. Within groups, the autism group was more successful in the explicit than the implicit condition (X 2 = 7.59, 1 df, p = .006), but for the other groups, differences were in the same direction but did not reach statistical significance.
Analysis of errors
An analysis of errors revealed that, within conditions, both story pairs were equally difficult for the autism group. However, for the other groups the two stories within the explicit condition were not equally difficult. When errors for all control subjects were pooled, more subjects passed the drink story and failed the ball-in-the-bucket story than the other way around (McNemar's test, x 2 = 11.13, p < .001). No difference in difficulty was found for the implicit stories.
Relationship with understanding false belief
In the false-belief composite test, the percentages of subjects who passed the test questions for both subtests was as follows: autism 22%; mental handicap 71%; normal 4-year-olds 77%. This result was similar to previous tests of false-belief understanding in autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Leslie & Frith, 1988; Perner et al., 1989) . The children with autism were significantly less successful than other groups (x 2 = 17.18,2 tf/, p < .001). The relationship between the accidents test and the false-belief composite test was explored by means of comparing numbers of subjects who passed one test and failed the other. For the two clinical groups, there was no evidence that the implicit task was easier or more difficult than false belief (McNemar's tests not significant). For the normal 4-year-olds, nine participants passed false belief and failed the implicit task, but only one showed the opposite pattern (McNemar's test, x 2 = 4.90, p < .05). With regard to the easier explicit condition, there seemed to be no difference in task difficulty for the 4-year-old and mental handicap groups, but in the autism group, nine passed the explicit task and failed false belief, whereas only one showed the reverse pattern (McNemar's test, x 2 = 4.90, p < .005). To summarize, judging desire satisfaction seemed easier for the autism group than did understanding false belief, but only when this could be done by reading off explicit goal information. An interesting finding of this study was that the normal 4-year-olds performed less well on the task than a similar group of Canadian children in Astington and Lee's (1991) investigation. In the explicit condition, 98% of the Canadian 4-year-olds passed, compared with only 48% in the present study. In the implicit version, 48% of the Canadian group passed, compared with only 35% of the 4-year-olds in this research. In an attempt to reconcile these findings, the performance of the Canadian 5-year-olds in the Astington and Lee study was compared with that of a "new" group of 5-year-old British children. This new group consisted of the 5-year-olds from the original 5-6-year group, together with 9 younger 5-year-olds from the same school (total 24, mean age 5.7). As with our younger group, performances in this new group were also low compared with the Canadian 5-yearolds: 63% passed the explicit version (compared with 98% of the Canadian group), and 50% passed the implicit (compared with 77%). It is unclear why our subjects showed a depressed performance, but Astington (personal communication, July, 1992) has also found problems in replicating the strong performances found in the original study.
Discussion
The accidents test is a test of understanding unfulfilled desires. Performance of children with autism differed significantly from that of children with mental handicap and normal 5-6-year-olds children only in the implicit version of the task. In this condition, information about the goals of the actors had to be inferred from the story context, before a strategy of matching goals and outcomes could be employed to judge whether or not desires were satisfied. Although all subjects found this version of the task more difficult than one in which goals and outcomes could be compared easily (presumably because they were not overtly specified and saliently depicted), the children with autism were more severely affected by the absence of explicit goal information. This implies that the theory of mind impairment in autism extends to the ability to understand the relation between goals and outcomes when a simple matching strategy is prevented. It should be noted that, in previous studies reporting unimpaired understanding of desire by children with autism, goals were overtly stated (Baron-Cohen, 1991a; Tan & Harris, 1991) .
The difficultly for normal 4-year-olds on the simple explicit test is quite surprising, because other studies have reported that goal-outcome matching can be done by children as young as 3 years old (Astington, Gopnik, & O'Neill, 1989; Shultz, Wells, & Sarda, 1980; Wellman & Woolley, 1990; Yuill, 1984) . Examination of the errors provides one possible explanation: the ball story seemed more difficult than the drink story, for control subjects but not for those with autism. Where errors occurred, they were more likely to be in this story. It may be that, although young children can readily understand that some people prefer milk and others orange juice, they cannot comprehend that people might be more pleased when successfully throwing a ball into one bucket than when getting it into another, very similar, bucket. Because only the control groups made more errors in this story than in the other, this may also be why the tendency for children with autism to perform less well than other groups in this condition did not reach significance. That is, this relatively poor performance by control groups in the Explicit task might be disguising a true autism-specific deficit in this straightforward desire-satisfaction task.
In Experiment 1, the two conditions differed not only in terms of whether goal information was implicit or explicit, but also in the test question ("Which boy is happy?" vs. "Which boy meant to . . . ?"). We know from previous studies that children with autism can make judgments of satisfaction (e.g., Which one is happy? See Baron-Cohen, 1991a). It is possible that their poor performance in the implicit condition of this experiment occurred because of a lack of understanding of the phrase "meant to." If this was a purely linguistic deficit, then use of an alternative form of wording (such as "What's he gonna do?") should overcome the problem. However, if the difficulty with the implicit condition reflects a cognitive deficit, as we believe, then such a change in wording should not affect the relative performance of the groups, and an autismspecific deficit should still be found. This was tested as part of Experiment 2.
Experiment 2: The Changed Plans Test Perner (1991) and Astington (1991) have argued that understanding the representational nature of desires may be more difficult than simply identifying whether or not a desire is satisfied. The same entity (object, event, situation) can appear desirable to one A utism and understanding desire \ g \ person, while at the same time being unde-wanted to achieve the outcome. That is, his sirable to another. According to Astington desire and his intention were, as is usual, in and Gopnik (1991), to understand this fact accord. Although the test question asks requires a concept of desire that includes its about his intended action (what he was "gopersonal, subjective nature. One needs to ing to do"), a correct answer may be given understand that desirability is not a prop-by judging what he wanted to achieve as erty of the object, but of the person's men-easily as by inferring what he planned to do. tal representation of the object. Not only For reasons of parsimony, the test is therecan an object be desirable to one person and fore considered to be one of understanding not another, but also it can be desirable to desires. In contrast to "satisfaction" tests of one person at one time and not at a later understanding desire, this method does not time. Again, understanding this may re-allow solution on the basis of goals and outquire a concept of the representational na-comes. In the present study, not only were ture of desire. In this experiment, we at-subjects not supplied with the goal in an extempted to test understanding of desire in plicit form, but furthermore they could not situations in which it is not a matter of satis-use the outcome as a clue to the original faction but of desire change, and in which mental state of the character, as outcomes the answer cannot be derived from a com-did not relate to the original desires, parison of goals and outcomes.
In this experiment, we asked subjects , _ i , .
, i i. J x« e M e t h o d
about the planned but unrealized actions of a character who has changed his or her plan . .
" . i • subjects
as a result of a change in external circumstances. That is, subjects had to understand The same children with autism, children a character who has changed his or her with mental handicap and normally-develmind. Perner (1991) argued that a represen-oping 4-year-olds who had participated in tational concept of mind is needed to under-Experiment 1 also took part in Experiment stand such a situation. To illustrate this 2. One subject in the autism group failed a point, Perner related an anecdote in which pretest (described below) and was dropped his 4-year-old daughter refused the peas she from the sample. This left 23 children with had previously asked for. When challenged, autism, 24 with mental handicap, and 23 she said, "I don't want them. I changed my normal children. Older normal children mind when you didn't look" (1991, p. 225). were not tested because pilot studies showed The basis of the experiment was a narrative that 4-year-olds performed well in this test, consisting of the following four elements:
(1) a protagonist desires an outcome and plans an action to achieve it; but (2) before
Task and materials
the act can be performed, an event occurs Five oral narratives were given in random that; (3) causes the protagonist to change order, each one illustrated by a series of his or her mind, and (4) produce some other four colored drawings. One of the stories is action, toward a different goal. The task re-shown in Figure 3 -a burglar wants to steal quired the subject to diagnose what the a clock, but when he sees a policeman apcharacter was going to do, before he or she pear he strokes a cat instead. The test queschanged his or her mind. tion asks about the burglar's initial desire, In one sense, this task relates to the as-before he changed his mind, pect of intention that Searle (1983) deNote that the narrative did not contain scribed as "prior intention." That is, it the verb phrase specifying the character's seems to involve the temporal separation initial intention or desire. Note also the inbetween a plan and its enactment. How-elusion of a control action question. This ever, it is true to say that the character not was to check story comprehension, the abilonly planned to perform the action, but also ity to extract information from the narra- tive, and the ability to respond verbally to an open question. The naming questions, which were only given if the desire question was failed, controlled for the possibility that failure was due to an inability to supply the appropriate vocabulary. Briefly, the other four narratives were as follows: a boy wants to give a dog a biscuit, but eats it himself when the dog growls; a girl wants to ride her bicycle, but decides to do a jigsaw because it rains; a boy wants to help his sister, but goes back to bed when he sees his mother come to help; a boy wants to pick an apple, but goes off with his football when he notices a gardener watching him. In two stories, the actor's desire was to help someone, in two it was a moral transgression (stealing) and in the other it was neutral. The outcomes were neither good nor bad.
Pretest screening for future tense understanding
Because the critical desire question within the main test involved asking about future events, it was necessary to ensure that all subjects could understand questions in dif-ferent tenses. Although there is evidence situation was highly familiar, action should that, in general, the acquisition of syntax have been easily predictable on the basis of follows a similar pattern in children with the "script" (Schank & Abelson, 1977 ) that autism to that seen in other children (Tager-all these school children could be assumed Flusberg, 1989 Flusberg, , 1991 ; Tager-Flusberg et to have. That is, in contrast to the desire al., 1990), some studies have found that question in the main test, there was no need children with autism are less likely than oth-to refer to the specific desires or intentions ers to use past tense morphemes correctly in of the protagonist to predict the next action, talking about past events (Howlin, 1984) . Comprehension of past tense terms has not _ , been well studied in autism. With regard to Frocedure future tense, there is little specific informa-Subjects were tested individually, in a quiet tion on whether this is problematic for chil-but familiar room at school. The future dren with autism.
3 A screening task was tense pretest was given first. Both future therefore devised, to ensure that no subject questions had to answered correctly for the was disadvantaged in the main task by an subject to proceed to the changed plans inability to understand the tense of the task. The five narratives were given in ranquestions. The exact form of the future dom order. One point was awarded for each tense question (and in the main test, the de-correct answer on the action and desire sire question) was "gonna." Pilot studies questions. For both types of question, the showed that 3-and 4-year-old normal chil-subject's answer had to include both an apdren found this easier to understand than propriate verb and the relevant object. In forms such as "will." The following story the example given above, a correct answer was acted out with a small boy doll and to the action question was "stroke the cat," brightly colored wooden models of a house or a similar phrase. The desire question reand a school: quired the answer "steal the clock" or something similar. Simply saying "clock" did not This is a house. This is school. Here is the boy constitute a satisfactory response, who lives in the house. the other groups, no participant failed the pretest. All the remaining children passed It might be objected that the pretest and t h e action questions in all five stories. Bemain test were both tapping the same con-cause there was no variance on this meacepts. However, because the house/school s u r e » it was not included in further analysis. Those subjects who (having failed a desire 3. Tager-Flusberg (1991) found that the modal verb * uestion ) w e r e »ven the naming questions forms "will" and "shall" were used to mark the preWe J" e » wl tn0Ut exception, able tO name the diction of future events by both children with au-objects in the pictures, tism and with Down syndrome. Interestingly, these
Results for the desire questions are SUmmodai verbs were rarely used by the autistic children marized in Table 3 . Scores for the three to express intention and volition, both of which are -_«,.^o u , j -• •. related to mental states. That study dealt with the g r 0 U p S W e r e s°m ewhat dissimilar in variexpression of tense morphemes, whereas the present a n c e » a s c a n b e s e e n f r o m the standard detask requires comprehension of a future tense viations, largely because of the excellent marker.
performance of the normal and mental handicap groups. Indeed, the normal children scored almost at ceiling on this task. In view of this lack of homogeneity of variance, nonparametric tests were used to analyze group differences. A Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA showed that the differences between groups were highly significant(x 2 = 17.52, p < .001). Post hoc testing of mean ranks, by Nemenyi's procedure (a version of Tukey's HSD test for ranked data; Hochberg & Tamhayne, 1987) , demonstrated that the autism group differed from the normal 4-year group (p < .01) and also from the mental handicap group (p < .05). These two control groups did not differ from one another.
Analysis of errors
Within the autism group, the number of errors on desire questions was similar (approximately six) for each of the five stories, In other groups, errors were too few to analyze. Thus, there was no evidence that any of the stories were more difficult to understand than others. In addition, the task was no more difficult for stories involving "bad" desires than for those with prosocial or neutral desires, as might have been expected from work with normal preschool children, which found antisocial motives were understood later than prosocial ones (Yuill, 1984) .
Analysis of error types showed that, for the autism group, two varieties of error were most frequent. First, a large proportion of errors (11 out of 30) appeared to be perseverative, in that the subject referred to the Same object as in the control question.
For example, subjects often said "stroke the cat" or simply "cat." It should be noted though, that a simple echoing of the control question responses is not the only explanation for this error, because both the correct o b j e c t a n d t h e o t h e r o n e w e r e d e p i c t e d i n pictures 1, 3, and 4. Secondly, many errors (13 out of 30) consisted of being unable to give a definitive response (i.e., "don't k n o w » o r n o , } Occasionally, errors took the form of an inappropriate verb (e.g., "look at the clock") or irrelevant phase. There was only one example of giving the appropriate noun ("clock") but no verb. Among the children with mental handicap, errors were very few, but almost all came into the "don't know" category. A similar analysis was not carried out for the normal children, as they performed almost at ceiling.
ip with understanding
Although the false-belief composite was scored on a criterion basis and the changedplans task involved actual scores, making direct comparisons difficult, changed plans seemed easier than false-belief. The perc e n t a f o f t h e . n o r m a l 4-year group who obtamed a maximum score (5) on changed plans was 91%, compared with 77% who passed both false-belief tasks. Among the mental handicap group, more subjects obtained maximum scores in changed plans (88%) than passed false belief (71%). Children with autism also seemed to fare better on changed plans than false belief (43% vs. 22%).
4
A similar number of participants in each group passed one test and failed the other. Data were therefore pooled in order to test the hypothesis that passing the false-belief task was more difficult than obtaining maximum score in the changed-plans test.
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Across all groups, 12 subjects "passed" ability to understand that desires may changed plans but failed false belief, com-change, and therefore show evidence of the pared with only one subject who showed the lack of a representational concept of mind opposite pattern (McNemar's test, x 2 = it is necessary to consider alternative expla-7.69, p < .01). Thus, the changed-plans nations for the poor performance of the autest appeared to be less difficult than stan-tism group in this task, dard tests of false belief.
First, it may be that these children are unfamiliar with the cultural meaning of Discussion t h e e v e n t s i n t h e narratives (Loveland, McEvoy, Kelley, & Tunali, 1990) . For exThe changed-plans test is a test of under-ample, they might have little knowledge standing a previous desire, when that desire about the habits of burglars and policemen remained unobservable and was not trans-or about taking things that do not belong to lated into action. On this test, children with one. However, the other four stories were autism were significantly impaired, relative about more ordinary situations, such as to children with mental handicap with wanting to play on a new bicycle, and three equivalent verbal ability and relative to nor-stories involved good or neutral desires mal 4-year-old children, over whom they rather than moral transgressions. The subhad a substantial verbal and nonverbal MA ejects with autism performed no better in advantage. The young normal children and these less sensational stories, those with mental handicap found this task Second, the syntax of the desire quesvery easy, despite the lack of specific infor-tion could have been too difficult. This does mation about goals and outcomes. The not seem likely because the groups were actor's goal was not specified in the narra-matched on a measure of understanding tive and there was no information about grammar, the desire question employed the outcome, because the test question asked simplest grammatical structure (avoiding what the protagonist was going to do prior conditional terms), and a pretest estabto an event that prevented the outcome. The Iished understanding of the precise form of only basis for "predicting" the action was tense of the desire question. (One possibilthe mental state (desire or intention) of the ity, however, is that the future task itself actor, which could be inferred from the could be done without understanding the context alone.
future question: The house and school were In this experiment, it was not the satis-the only possible objects that the subjects faction conditions of desire that needed to could refer to. In any replication of this be understood. Because the desires in ques-study, it would be desirable to include one tion were changed (rather than being ful-or more "distractor" objects in the future filled or not fulfilled), the test may have in-task, such as a tree.) volved understanding the representational Third, the possibility remains that the nature of desire. It required participants to children with autism failed because of an inrealize that desires exist at the mental level, ability to create a novel utterance, because representing aspects of the world as desir-the desire question required construction of able or not desirable. It would appear that a novel verb phrase, whereas the action children with autism are impaired in the question could be answered by repeating a ability to understand this aspect of desire, phrase from the narrative. However this compared with children with mental handi-seems unlikely when one considers the error cap and normal children. Although there patterns of the children with autism. All the was some indication that the task is less dif-children had the appropriate nouns within ficult than understanding false belief, an their expressive vocabulary (naming ques autism-specific deficit was still apparent, tions), but only one error involved the use However, before concluding that children of the noun alone, without the verb If the with autism are specifically impaired in the problem was with producing a novel verb phrase, one would have expected more sub-Experiment 2 suggest that children with aujects to produce the correct noun by itself, tism have difficulty in understanding the Instead, children who failed appeared even changeable nature of desire, to misunderstand which object was involved.
~ . _.. r: .. . . .. ., ...^ General Discussion Fourth, we can rule out the possibility that the children with autism failed the de-At the beginning of this paper, we asked sire question because they did not under-two questions about understanding volistand sabotage (the desired action was sabo-tional mental states. First, can children with taged by, for example, the arrival of the autism understand desire satisfaction? An policeman). This is because Sodian and earlier study by Baron-Cohen (1991a ) sugFrith (1992 have shown that understanding gested that they can, because they could sabotage is within the understanding of predict emotions based on the satisfaction children with autism.
or frustration of a person's expressed deFinally, we can exclude the possibility sire. However, we found that this underthat the children with autism were unable to standing of the satisfaction conditions of extract information from pictures. The ac-desire is fragile, and does not extend to sitution question required this ability, as did the ations in which information about goals is TROG language test. Furthermore, other only implicit in the context. In such situastudies have shown that action sequences tions, the children with autism were procan be understood in picture form (Baron-foundly impaired relative to MA-matched Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1986) . However, it children without autism. Second, do chilmay be that the desire question requires us-dren with autism understand that desires ing context to make inferences, rather than are mental representations of situations, just to read off the information in picture and can be changed "at will"? This concept form. Making inferences from context may seems to be different from understanding be beyond the inferential abilities of chil-when desires are satisfied, and we suggested dren with autism. For example, in the Bur-that it requires understanding of the repreglar story, the subject needed to infer from sentational nature of desires (Perner, 1991) . the pictures alone that burglars usually steal Unlike children with mental handicap and things, that gold clocks are worth stealing, young normal children (with a distinct MA and that policemen prevent theft (the wider disadvantage), who found the task almost context). Furthermore, the pictures are the trivially easy, children with autism were relonly source of information about the nar-atively impaired in this test. Thus, in both row context, that is, the mental state of the experiments, children with autism were actor. For example, the burglar was "acting found to show impairments relative to other suspiciously," by looking at the open win-children of equivalent or lower mental age. dow in a furtive manner. In the other stoThe conclusion to be drawn from these ries, the protagonist's intentions towards two tests of understanding desires is that the the desired object were indicated by his or theory of mind impairment in children with her gaze direction. Thus, the problem for autism is not restricted to epistemic mental the children with autism might have been in states such as belief, but also extends to vomaking inferences from contextual infor-lition. This deficit is unlikely to be a purely mation that was not specifically mentioned linguistic one because it appeared despite in the narrative, rather than in making men-varying the wording of test questions. This tal state inferences per se (Frith, 1989) . A finding suggests that the deficit is cognitive test of this possibility would be to devise a in nature. These two experiments suggest control task involving physical causal that children with autism may be less imevents, in which participants must construct paired in understanding desires than they nonmental state information from context are in taking into account beliefs, but their alone. In sum, however, the results from comprehension of desire may stem from \ 67 only a very limited concept: knowing that priate object. However, the fact that an people like different things and are happy even more common error was to say "don't when they get them, and so on. A full un-know" makes this explanation seem less derstanding of when desires are satisfied likely-more than 40% of errors were not and when they are not seems beyond their of the "reality" type. For the accidents test, grasp. Furthermore, they have incomplete it is difficult to see how a domain-general understanding of desire/change. The impli-problem with cognitive flexibility or recation is that the representational or subjec-sponse inhibition could account for the diftive nature of desire is not comprehended.
ficulties of the children with autism. First, One issue to be dealt with is why the im-the incorrect (unintentional) story within plicit condition of the accidents test (Exper-each pair did not contain more salient inforiment 1) was so very difficult. This task was mation. Second, there was no habitual reharder than the changed-plans test, and in-sponse to be inhibited. Finally, it was not deed, for normal 4-year-olds, it was harder the case that children with autism made the than false belief. The implicit task involved incorrect choice systematically-rather, using (inferred) data about goals to com-they appeared to make their selections ranpare goals and outcomes for each story of domly. the pair. Thus, a substantial amount of inAnother alternative to the theory of mind formation had to be handled. In contrast, explanation for these results is that a more each trial in the changed-plans task in-general deficit is present in autism, convolved only one story. It seems possible that nected with the processing of contextual inthe extreme difficulty of the implicit test for formation. Frith (1989) has suggested that a 4-year-olds might have been partly to do weak drive for central coherence may be the with information-processing demands of a underlying difficulty for people with autism, general nature, not simply the theory of and that impairments in interpreting behavmind aspect. It would be interesting to see ior in terms o f mental states may be part of a if the task is easier if presented as single sto-more general problem with use of context to ries, rather than as a forced-choice between derive high-level meaning. It is true that both two similar alternatives. It should be re-the implicit condition of the accidents test membered that many of the children with and the changed-plans experiment involved autism in this study, who were profoundly using context to obtain critical information, impaired in this task, had mental ages (ver-Comparable tests now need to be devised bal and nonverbal) that were much higher that tap the ability to use context both with than the normal 4-year-olds.
and without specifically mental-state mateCould the autism-specific deficits found rial. It is possible, however, that deficits in in these two experiments be explained in understanding mental states may be additerms of a more general cognitive deficit? tional to and independent of a tendency to For example, could it be a deficit in execu-process information in a "piecemeal" fashtive function, or the high-level ability to ion (Frith &Happ6,1994) . plan and control behavior, rather than imIn summary, previous studies of underpairment in the social domain specifically? standing volition by children with autism More specifically, could the autism results have only investigated very simple aspects have arisen from an inability to inhibit an of desire, and found that these were not speincorrect, but irresistibly salient response cifically impaired. The two experiments re- (Hughes & Russell, 1993) ? In the changed-ported in this paper suggest that underplans experiment, many errors involved standing more complex levels of volition is repetition of the answer to the action ques-in fact impaired in many individuals with t i o n -t h a t is, a type of "reality error." It is autism. This means that both aspects of bepossible that this error resulted from an in-lief-desire reasoning are difficult for people ability to inhibit the more salient "reality" with this disorder. Naturally, a comprehenresponse, and shift attention to the appro-sive impairment in such reasoning capacity has profound consequences for understanding the social world. One effect may be a relative insensitivity to others' wishes and emotions. There is a paradox in the evidence related to emotion comprehension in autism. On one hand, there are many reports of lack of empathy and insensitivity to others' expressions of emotion. Furthermore, there is some evidence that facial expressions of affect may hold less significance for individuals with autism (Weeks & Hobson, 1987) . On the other hand, in experimental settings, children with autism can sometimes understand emotions as well as other children with equivalent verbal ability (Baron-Cohen, 1991a; Hobson, Ouston, & Lee, 1989) . One explanation for this apparent contradiction may be that predicting simple emotions (e.g., happiness, sadness) on the basis of goals and outcomes can be done "intellectually," by observing contingencies between events and behavior (emotional expression). In contrast, a sophisticated conceptual framework of the causes of emotion (that is, the beliefs and desires of the person) may be required in order for the significance of affect to be fully appreciated (Harris, 1989) .
